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Article 2

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND IRRESISTIBLE
IMPULSE AS A DEFENSE
By

JOHN

H. A.

WHITMAN

At no more opportune moment could the question of capital
punishment be brought before the niinds of intelligent beings
than at the present when crime is so open and rampant, and
when prominent lawyers and criminologists are advocating a
total abolition of the death penalty on the grounds, that men
being moved by certain irresistible impulses, are not responsible
for their actions. The rapidity with which crimes of violence
have increased and the disregard with which human life is held
today has already merited for us the appellation, "the most
lawless nation claiming place among civilized nations of the
world". If life and property are to be respected, the potential
criminal must be made to realize that the commandment, "thou
shalt not kill", is more than a mere law mbodied in our statute
books. The law must have a sanction and that -sanction is capital punishment since it is the only punishment that fits the
crime.
The infliction of the death penalty as a punishment for crime
is of great antiquity.* It dates back to the very. dawn of creation
when. Cain, the first murderer, uttered his fears that "whosoever
should find him would slay him". Holy Writ is rich in citations
showing conclusively that both Israel and Judea retained capital
punishment as a part of their criminal code to the time of their
destruction. Both Greece and Rome subjected their criminals
to most inhuman torments. The favorite methods of executions
with the Romans were by crucifixion and by breaking on the
wheel. With the Greeks, the freemen were forced to drink of
th hemlock,' while criminals of low gra~d were beaten to death.
Extreme severity in the execution of criminals marked the reigns
6f the European monarchs; and at the end of the eighteenth
century, the criminal law of all Europe was so ferocious and
violent in its administration that abolitionists rose in indignation
* Sir Matthew Hale. Historla Piaettorun

Coronae. "By the ancientest
divine law, that we read, the punishment of homocide was with
death."

i Socrates.
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and brought about a mitigation of the severity of existing laws.The death penalty has ever been recognized in the United States.
For the most part it is regulated by the laws of the constituent
States.
Both advocates and abolitionists of the- death penalty admit
that some curb to crime is necessary, but differ as to what is the
most efficient method of attaining the desired end. With
those who are opposed to the death penalty, it is the tendency
to regard crime as a manifestation of abnormality if not of
disease.- Hence they advocate segregation and education against
death. They claim, "Intelligent segregation will afford present
safety and protect future generations. Society can afford to
forego its lust for revenge as manifested in hangings and turn to
the method of treatment which holds out promise for genuine
progress".4 The doctrine of humanitarianism has gained such
momentum during recent years that many otherwise intelligent
beings have come to the conclusion that the death penalty is unchristian since it makes no attempt to reform the criminal, which
should be the object of all punishment, inhuman and serves no
purpose among civilized people. Others maintain that capital
punishment is not authorized by any right and that the State,
in executing a criminal becomes criminal itself. Still others as
Dr. C. B. Davenport and Clarence Darrow, teaching the doctrines voiced by Herbert Spencer of a half century ago, have advanced the theory in which they deny human responsibility in
toto and consequently any idea of punishment for crime. 5
To argue that capital punishment is contrary to nature
and hence unchristian is to deny the veracity of the word of
God as contained in the Scriptures, since both the Old and the
New Testament prove -nost-convincingly that the death penalty
prevailed under repdated divin sanctions during the entire
period of the Law and the Prophets. He who claims to be a
christian arid believes in the inspiration of the Bible must admit
that the death penalty was at one time lawful and right "He
2 Precarrio in Italy, Montesqieu In France and Jeremy Bentham in
England.
s Darrow, Crime Its Cause and Treatment.
4 Segregation vs. Hanging. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.
Vol. 2., p. 512.
5 Darow. Crime Its Causes and Treatment.-C. B. Davenport. Heredity
Culpability, etc. Popilar Science Monthly, July 1913. Sir Matthew
Hale. Hixtorla Placitoram Coronae. pp. 1-10.
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that striketh and killeth a man, dying let him die." Lev. 24:17Whosoever shall shed man's blood, his blood shall be shed; for
man was made to the image of God." Gen. 9:6-The idolater
and the blasphemer as well as the murderer were subjected to the
same punishment. Num. 25 :3-Lev. 24:16.
Under the New Dispensation, the law did not lose its sanction even though the spirit of the law was one of love and forgiveness. The precepts of the Sermon on the Mount were never
intended to abrogate the authority of legitimate governments;
for St. Paul discussing the formation of governments affirms
that it is derived from God. "For he is God's minister to thee
for good. But if thou do that which is evil, fear, for he beareth
not the sword in vain. For he is God's minister." Rom.13 ;4. He
also says "If I have wronged any man or done anything worthy
of death, I refuse not to die'. From which we may conclude
that even after the promulgation of the Gospel, there were
crimes which justice not only allowed but required to be punished
with death. The logical conclusion then is that capital punishment is not legal assassination and having received the repeated
divine sanction both in-the Old and the New Law, it cannot
possibly be unchristian or contrary to rfatiure.
Omitting entirely any idea of divine sanction, it has been
the universal practice for nations both civilized and barbaric to
rvisit certain crimes with the death penalty. -Frequently institutions have revolted at the cruelty that so often atended execuions; but never has the lawfulness ahd-the justice of a state
or a nation to protect its own integrity and the security'-f its
citizens been questioned. Take away this sanotion and you imperil the very existence of society and jeopardize the lives and
proprty of its members. Hence the common consent of man-kind, which id matters of common morality is a criterion of
truth, shows the fallaciousniess of the humanitarian argument
against capital punishment.
Inflicting punishment according to the humanitarian idea,
-the safety of the injured is not to be considered, but simply the
reformation of the injurer. Assuredly the reformation of the
offender is one of the objects a humane judge will have in view
in the adjustment of his judgments; but it cannot be viewed as
the primary object, since the criminal has cut himself off from
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consideration in acting contrary to the dictates of reason, his
only claim to consideration, or as supplying the sole standard.
The protection of the unoffending, if we reduce the question to
a mere personal balance, is at least as important an object of
the humanitarian as the reform of the offender. Moreover if
we examine this theory critically, we find that we are reduced
to this absurdity, that we can punish only when we can reform
hence that the desperate and irreclaimable criminal cannot be
punished at all. The present theory of punishment follows the
principle that the more incorrigible a criminal appears to be.by
reason of his relapsing into crime, the longer and more severe
should be his chastisement, but the humanitarian teaches the
more incorrigible the wrong-doer is, the less is he to be punished
and he is to be relieved in proportion to his steadfastness and persistency in iniquity. Hence in endeavoring to achieve morality
they destroy it. To use the words of Horace Mann, "The object
of punishment is the prevention from evil; it never can be made
impulsive to good".
"The state, like man himself, together with the sovereignity
which it enjoys, is the creature of the eternal law, one of the
chief among the agencies through which the Infinite Reason
works out its designs. Man is by his nature a social being. His
inherent attributes and instincts irresistibly impel him into association with other men. His happiness and development depend
upon the effect produced .upon him by the actions and the reactions which in society alone are possible and hence human society is an essential factor in the advancement of the universe
itself. But society, implies peace and order. Conflict and antagonism are not society, nor is it possible that in an atmosphere
of strife and contention human relations should long subsist
and exercise their proper influence upon mankind.
The existence of society requires that rights should be defined and respected, that duties be recognized and observed, that
injuries, when committed, should be redressed. It also requires
that when necessary these rights should be protected, these
duties enforced, and these wrongs punished by an authority
,which cannot be resisted or gainsaid. In a word the law must
have a sanction if it is to subsist. Therefore, as sovereignty
alone can adequately protect these rights, enforce, these duties
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and redress these wrongs, it follows that from the eternal law
which establishes society the sovereignty of the State and its
right and obligation to make and administer laws for its own
government are likewise derived. Hence human laws made in
accordance with the dictates of the Supreme Reason ar sanctioned not merely by human authority-but also by the authority
6
of God."1
If the end for which civil society exists is to preserve justice and promote the common good of all coficerned, it must of
necessity enjoy the means adequate to that end. Experience
has taught men that some criminals are so debase, so destitute
of any idea of morality and have become so hardened in crime
that they are insensible to any form of punishment other than
the death penalty. Moreover there are some crimes that are so
revolting that nothing less than death is capable, of furnishing
a proportional atonement. The very frequency of a crime must
often supply a very strong ground for the infliction of a severe
punishment. Consequently the right of the sword is an absolutte
sine qua non to society not only as a means of equalizing justice
but especially as a deterrent to others. Furthermore, if the laws
under which men live are violated; there is a disturbance of what
was before, and this disturbance is the penal sanction of the
law, otherwise the law, the violation of which was not attended
by this disturbance, would be no law.
If no two human beings can live together without laws,
neither can they without the penal sanction practically enforcing
them. Penalty then is essential to law, but all crimes are not
of equal enormity, and punishment must be proportionate to the
offence; sonsequently such crimes as murder, matricide, etc. so
is capable of restoring the moral ofder to its pristine condition.7
disturb the social order that no other penalty known to man
6 Blaekstone, Corn vol. 1 pp 47-49.-Robinson, A. M. Jurisprudence.
Cronin. The Sel6nce of Ethics. vol. 2 pp. 462-472.

Cardinal Mercier. Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosphy.
Vol. 2. (second impression) p. 328; 337-337.
Rikaby. Moral Philosophy. pp. 317-17. Lortie Ethica. p. 334.
Zigliara. "De auctoritate sociali". vol. 3. pp. 234-243.
"De origine societatis civilis". vol. 3 p. 228-234.
"De potestate judiclarla politicae auctoritatis",. vol. 3. p.
251-257.
7 Coppens, Moral Philosophy, p. 152.
Cronin, Science of Ethics, Vol. 2; 472-477.
Lortle, Ethica, p. 330
Zigliara, vol. 3; 227. Fjnis iinmediatus societatis civilis est procurare

quibus et facilus et e....eacens huJus vtae Imperfectam felecitatem
socii consequi voleant.
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The law of exact retribution or vindictive justice demands that
equity be preserved as far as it is possible between the nijury
inflicted and the punishment to -be meted out. There are however some crimes that are so monstrous and unnatural that
there is no method of punishment known to man other than
the ultimumn' supplisiumn that is capable of equalizing justice.
Hence death is inflicted not that it is always an equivalent for
death but because it is the highest penalty that man can inflict
and alone approaches a proportionate satisfaction."
Nevertheless, there has come into being, of late years a
' school of modern thought which denies to man responsibility.
The tenets' of this naturalistic body may be summed up in the
words of Professor Harry E. Barnes, "We have given, up the
notion of man as a free moral agent and have come to the conclusion that human conduct is the result of a vast number of
influences, alike hereditary and cultural, which make our action
at any .ime as thoroughly determined as any other natural phenomenon." This same doctrine is duplicated in the teachings of
Clarence Darrow and Dr. C. B. Davenport.9
Where 'Professor Barnes gets his basis for such an argument is difficult to ascertain since the evidence of psychology,
medicine and law proves the contrary to be true. To admit
,the negation of responsibility is to destroy the very foundation
,of all morality. If man is no longer responsible for his actions,
he becomes a creature neither praiseworthy or blamable. All
idea of merit and demerit is annihilated since an action to be
meritorious or otherwise, must be free and proceed from a
responsible agent. That the will is free is an indisputable fact
of consciousness. Every man knows that he is free as assuredly
as he knows his own existence. He knows himself as possessing
the power of choice, of choosing one from two or more objects
which may be before his mind. There is no normal being but
-knows that when he violates an obligation imposed by his concience and does evil ,that he might have fulfilled it and have
8

Coppins, moral Philosophy, p. 152.
Rikaby,

M1oral Philosophy, p.

307.

Lortie, EtEhica, p. 350.
9 Professor H. E. Barnes, The Crime Complex, Current History vol. 21;
306.
Clarence Darrow, Crime Its Cause and Treatment.
Dr. C. B. Davenport, Heredity, Culpability, Praiseworthiness, Punishment, Reward. Popular Science Mo. July 1913.
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done right. In this power of contrary choice, which is implied
in the existence of will in its relation to right and wrong, is
found the basis of moral responsibility and the reason for the
praise and blame of conscience. Conscience, then, is an unimpeachable witness to this alternative power of the will. All
moral distinctions are based on it. All law depends upon it and
all punishment finds in it its reason and justification. 01
The capacity of imputability Kraeplin says, "depends upon
two elements. First, a faculty of intelligence; the general faculty
of judging what is permitted or forbidden, what is useful or
harmful, and the special faculty of comprehending the importance and consequence of the act which one commits. Secondly,
the faculty of volition; that is, the faculty of choosing between
several possible acts, and deciding after reflection and conformable to the tendencies of one's own personality. Hence imputability depends upon a certain amount of intelligence and
will." '" Both Binet and Kraelpin agree that normal man has
the power of choosing between several possible acts and that he
is therefore responsible. The criminal then, is a person whose
intelligence is sound.
The theory of determinism repudiates the idea of freewill and makes man merely a biological product.' 2 "His acts are
absolutely determined for him on the basis of his biological
heredity. Hence there is not the slighest iota of freedom of
choice allowed to either the criminal or the normal citizen in his
daily conduct."'8
Most assuredly heredity and social environment does influence responsibility to a limited extent. It weakens a man's
power of resistance but by no means does it destroy it. Moreover heredity and social environmeh't weakens an individual's
power of resistance only in so far as he has permitted himself
to follow the lines of least resistance in an atmosphere of vice and
wickedness. His condition is, in reality, the result of repeated
crime and consequently he is at least responsible in causa. He
chooses crime because he loves it. Binet says, "To our minds,
neither the accumulation of physical stigmata nor the most
io

Cardinal Mercier, Ianual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, Vol. 1;
257-77.
11 Journal of Crirn. Law and Criminologv, vol 5: 68.
12 Dr. C. D. Davenport. Heredity etc. Popular Science Mo. July 1913.
is Prof. H. E. Barnes. The Crime Complex. Current Hist. vol. 21; 306-31.
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charged heredity is sufficient to stamp a man who commits a
crime as irresponsible."'4 Hence Binet maintains "that normal
human beings are responsible for their acts, and that crimes
can with justice be imputed to them. Irresponsibility can only
15
arise when the subpect is not normal."'
Even students of medicine tell us that though all action
be determined by physiological brain state which immediately
antecedes the action; yet that same physiological state is in
part made up of past experience impressions. 6 Such impressions
influence the translation of the impulse into action. On this
basis, then giving away to the impulse is indefensible, for the,
individual has choice; i.e. by virtue of the past experiences. And
punishment for the sake of deterring others is necessary in
order that these preventive brain impressions be created in
others. Again, though some medical scientists maintain that
irresistible impulse does exist, yet much uncertainty concerning
the question is found amony psychiatrists. Many conceive genuine cases of irresistible impulse as being exceedingly rare and
as being -always open to suspicion.17 From this standpoint it
is easy to derive the corollary that psychiatrists themselves
experience considerable difficulty in determining when such a
state of mind obtains.' In the face of such diversity of opinion
among medico-legal authorities; how can a lawyer urge the irresistible impulse as an ameliorating circumstance?
To plead irresistible impulse as a defence for crime is to
beg the question of our entire system of jurisprudence. Our
American system of judicial procedure is based squarely upon
the doctrine of responsibility. If by application of the irresistible doctrine a criminal is excused, then by the same token a
defendant in a suit for breach of contract could excuse himself
by maintaining that the breach on his part was irresistible, and
that he is not responsible therefore for the damage of the plaintiiff. If no punishment can be imposed upon one who violates
his neighbor's natural and inalienable right of life, then how
can punishment be imposed upon one who merely violates a
1I Journal of Crlu. Law and Criminology. vol 5.
15 Jourani of Crim. Law find Criminology. vOl. 5, p.

16 Aschaffenburg, Crime and Its Iepression. p. 262.
17 Singer and Krohn. Insnnity and The Law. p.

161.

Rasanoff, MIanual of Psychiatry. p. 322.
18 Jacoby, The Unsound Mind and The Law. p. 62.
Barret, Legal Medicine and Toxiology. pp. 552-58.

6S.
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contractural right of his neighbor? To admit the theory of
irresistible impulse and the consequent doctrine of irresponsibility is to adjourn the civil and criminal courts by denying
their jurisdiction.
Moreover upon the question of irresistible impulse there is
an irreconcilible conflict in the legal authorities. The doctrine
that there can be an irresistible impulse that will excuse from
responsibility for ccrime, one who is able to distinguish right
from wrong is expressly rejected in the following cases. Reg.
vs. Burton.3Fost, & F. 772; U. S. vs. Holmes.l.Cliff.981; People
vs. Hoin.62.Cal.120; People vs. Coleman.lN.Y.Crim.1. For other
cases see Am. Digest.
In Choice vs. State. 31.Ga.424. it was held that responsibility
depends upon the possession of will and not the power over it.
In State vs. Harrison.36.W.Va.729. the court held that if at
the time of the act the criminal knows right from wrong and
knows the nature and character of the particular act and its
consequences, and knows that it is wrong and is hurtful to
another, and deserves punishment, even though he be partially
insane; yet he is responsible for his criminal act. In such cases
no mere irresistible impulse to do an act will exempt him from
criminal responsibilty for such act.'
In United States vs. Young 25.Fed.Rep.710. the court maintained that a man may be driven to a desperate and homicidal
act by morbid impulse, but that the cases in which the defendant is wholly irrespjonsible are rare, the difficulty in the way of
applying the test very great, and that the court was compelled
to adhere to the right and wrong test until something better
was devised. State vs. Bundy.24.S.C.439. held the same opinion.
In fine, if the objective in inflicting the death penalty is to
deter others from criminal acts and thus safeguard the interests
of society, this theory is not inconsistent with the theories of
Behaviorism, Mechanistic Determination and Irresistible Impulse, since it has no immediate connection with moral wrongdoing. It simply strives to place before the minds of others
than the persons punished a barrier, an inhibition or a fear
against committinug like acts." Hence why then should the
mental state of the doer of the act make a difference in the conseiquence?"

